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Keeping credentials on the laptop while agents run on remote VMs

Running coding agents without handing them my credentials · Antonio, pico.sh · antonio's blog, November 13, 2026

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Antonio runs Claude Code, Codex and longer-running agents on disposable VMs, and keeps his SSH keys, his 1Password vault and his logged-in gh and cloud CLIs on his laptop. He rejects the two usual fixes: copying tokens onto the VM, where every process can read them, and forwarding the SSH agent with ssh -A, which lets the VM use every key "without asking and without any record of what it signed." His tool, lend, sits in front of the existing SSH agent. A remote agent asks to run a command through lend exec or an MCP tool, run_local_command, that requires a reason. The laptop checks the request against a default-deny policy, asks for approval (Touch ID on macOS), runs the command locally and streams back stdout, stderr and the exit code. Policy rules can inject secrets such as GH_TOKEN from 1Password into an approved command without the VM ever seeing them, hide or limit SSH keys, cap signatures per session and grant short leases. A PermissionRequest hook sends Claude Code's ordinary permission prompts to the same dialog. He lists the limits himself: approved commands run unsandboxed as his user, approving a shell or interpreter amounts to approving anything, the caller details in the prompt come from the VM and can be faked, and the tool is early and runs on macOS and Linux only.

Why it matters: A default-deny allowlist with per-request approval, executed where the credential lives, keeps long-lived tokens out of the agent's environment entirely. Antonio's own caveat sets the design rule: approval only limits what runs if the approved command cannot run arbitrary input, so the allowlist has to name narrow commands and never a shell.