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OpenAI documents the Codex sandbox and says stdio MCP servers run outside it

Inside the Codex sandbox · Michael Bolin, OpenAI · OpenAI Engineering, November 18, 2026

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Codex runs commands in the user's own environment and limits them with each platform's sandboxing: Seatbelt on macOS, bubblewrap with seccomp on Linux. The built-in :workspace profile allows writes inside the workspace but keeps .git and .codex read-only, allows broad reads, and turns network access off. The post names a gap in those defaults. An agent could inject code into a locally installed package such as node_modules/prettier, which Git often ignores, and an editor that runs that copy on save would execute it outside the sandbox.

MCP is a second gap: "For a stdio MCP server configured in config.toml, the Codex harness does not attempt to sandbox the command used to start the server." The post shows how to wrap such a server in codex sandbox --permission-profile, with network access off and writes limited to named directories. It also notes that broad wildcard domain rules or access to DNS services can still permit DNS-based exfiltration through the network proxy.

Why it matters: If your Codex setup starts stdio MCP servers, they run with your full user permissions unless you wrap them yourself. The codex sandbox command also lets you test a permission profile against the specific writes it is meant to block before an agent runs under it.