Three breaches, endless leaks: Your AI supply chain needs canaries · HD Moore, Chief Research Officer, Dragos · Dragos blog, November 19, 2026
Two million bait prompts show inference data leaking through routers, resellers and breached providers
From July through November, Moore's team sent roughly two million prompts to AI services. Each prompt carried its own AWS key, DNS name, URL or other secret that had never been used anywhere else, and the team ran the servers those secrets pointed to. The post reports three kinds of leak. Attackers were stealing requests from three hosting providers, none of which knew until Dragos told them. In the largest case "a couple hundred" bait AWS keys were stolen, and the bait keys were used for tens of thousands of AWS API calls. Those calls listed S3 buckets, searched Secrets Manager and tried to enable Bedrock models. Marketplace sellers who undercut on price logged the prompts they routed, and individuals then tried the stolen passwords by hand. One Chinese AI lab, which the post does not name, fetched the secret URLs from more than half of the prompts sent to its models, including roughly two-thirds of those marked "no data collection" or Zero Data Retention. Prompts sent to US hosts that resell its models reached the same scraper.
The team also traced about two thousand routes, using image fetches and deliberately broken requests whose nested error messages reveal each hop. Several hundred included a system they could not identify, and one marketplace seller "quietly adds about a thousand hidden tokens to every prompt." Dragos names none of the providers involved. It says one has issued a preliminary notice and another has still not disclosed its breach. Separately, a Hacker News user posted what they describe as an email from OpenRouter saying a security researcher's test URLs, sent to MiniMax models from July to October, were later accessed by a third party. That email does not name the researcher, and the poster says OpenRouter has published no page or blog post about it.
Why it matters: Moore's own summary is that "a privacy flag only binds the first hop" and that "AI agents will happily send whatever they can read, including credentials." An agent that can read your .env file can put its contents into a prompt, and that prompt may pass through hops you never chose. The post's advice is cheap to act on: pick upstream providers yourself, stay out of reseller marketplaces, and seed a fake credential into the context your agents already send, treating any use of it as an incident.